text version of my project piece...(the real deal ;)

Human beings have the ever so complicated predisposition of being aware of their existence. Whether this is seen as a blessing or a curse is up to individual determination and even that varies depending on a host of factors (place and time, culture, pre/post daily coffee ;). It is safe to say, though, humans have pondered their existence for hundreds of years and continue to do so in ways that are congruent with the time, place and culture in which they are operating. As basic needs are accounted for (i.e. food, shelter and overall security) more time and mental energy are available for people to questions their existence and attempt to make sense of what it means to be human.

At the core of human existence is the individual. There seems to be a common tendency for individuals to seek out their place within the larger whole, whether consistent with or in opposition to, and identifying oneself is central to this desire. In the same sense, whenever we look at society and the resulting social behavior we are also looking at its constituent parts, individuals. In regards to this “corporate behavior” Ruth Benedict says, “It is the world with which each person is severally presented, the world from which he must make his individual life” (Benedict, 1934, p. 251). It is the fashioning of this individual life that calls for the need to create one’s own unique identity.

Identity has become a buzz word today in the field of anthropology and with good reason. The word has been designated to carry a hefty load and is bound to be used in the multi-purpose fashion it’s inclined to. Webster’s Dictionary describes it for our purposes as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual: individuality; the relation established by psychological identification.” Dictionary.com defines it as “the condition of being oneself or itself, and not another.” Simply put, and a bit more applicable here, identity is the way(s) in which a person is, or wishes to be, known by certain others (Cohen, 1993, p. 195). This last definition is most appropriate because it alludes to the fact that identity is dynamic and doesn’t necessarily reveal a truthful representation and it also accounts for the fact that specificity matters when dealing with who is witnessing this identity.

Two components are of utmost importance when discussing identity and how it is created and upheld by individuals: culture and symbols. In his 1993 article, Cohen describes the two ideally as “the means by which we make meaning and with which we make the world meaningful to ourselves” and “inherently meaningless, pragmatic devices which are invested with meaning through social processes of one kind or another,” respectively. He goes on to say that symbols are the vehicles of culture and that they are potent resources in the arena of identity because culture is represented as identity through symbols: simple in form, complex in substance because of their malleability, imprecision, and multivocality (p. 201). These descriptions depict for us why identity is such a dynamic entity and they set the stage for our discussion of the complex relationship between identity and anonymity.

The Structuralist belief of binary opposition is appropriate in our
discussion because identity and anonymity can be viewed as such. While binary opposites assist us in organizing human thought, a bias is often present, giving privilege to one term over the other. In general, throughout history and in the present, anonymity has been the one to obtain a negative reputation. The reasons for this vary but an association of anonymity with socially “unacceptable” behavior (as defined by society) and the mere fact that people often fear the unknown, are at the top of the list for putting anonymity on the negative side of the fence.

Some of the earliest examples of how identity has been privileged historically can be linked not with identity as a subjective psychological process of finding “one’s self” but as an objective means of strict identification of a person; “who is this person?” (the latter) in contrast to the former,“what kind of person is this?” (Caplan & Torpey, 2001, p. 3). Caplan and Torpey note that the need for authentification and identification increased toward the end of the 14th century as the expansion of information exchange and use of written documents in administration accelerated well into the 15th century. This was demonstrated in the use of badges for pilgrims and the poor, need for journeymen and beggars to carry letters with them issued by a priest or bishop, and diplomats being required to carry patents of appointment and letters of recommendation. This highlights the second of the two fundamental categories of identification: 1) the individual concerned is absent; by what means can others recognize him and 2) he is present; who is he, and is he really who he claims to be (Caplan et al., 2001). Our current investigation into anonymous behavior will expound on the first category.

Stepping away from the objective aspect of identification for a moment we focus on the importance of creating an identity, whether its creation is conscious or unconscious. For our purposes the subjective aspect is essentially what matters most because as one becomes grounded in the identity they have created for themselves we are able to see relationships between the individual and their behavior. Although it does not give a direct cause and effect link between the two, a substantial amount of overlapped can be derived from these relationships. This provides useful for us because the reasons why people choose to be or not to be anonymous are of interest.

It is helpful to refer to the Utilitarian Philosophy (i.e. moral worth of an action is solely dependent on utility, or its contribution to happiness), particularly to the work of John Stuart Mill, when discussing why individuals take the actions that they do. In particular, he presents the idea “that which gives us pleasure may be opaque to us until we have experienced a range of alternatives” (Mill, 1921, p. xiii). Based on his idea that happiness is found typically in activity, and not merely sensations, we can say that the autonomous choice to partake in certain actions are more valid if the individual has experienced a range of options. After many reviews of Utilitarianism, Mill affirms in On Liberty “that our natures are diverse and complex, so that there is no one form of life, no one set of pleasures, in which we can all find happiness” (p. xiv). The implications of these statements are huge when taken in the context of the desire and practice of individual identity on the one hand and anonymity on the other, they allow for a reasoning behind the differentiation of individual's desires to be or not to be anonymous.

It is important to clarify what is meant when we use the word anonymity, or better yet, its parent adjective anonymous. It was brought into English from Greek and literally translates as “without name” but is further defined by Webster’s Dictionary as 1 : not named or identified, 2: of unknown authorship or origin, and 3 : lacking individuality, distinction, or recognizability. The implications go way beyond these clean cut definitions, though. They account for the possibility of identity to be concealed in a variety of circumstances but do little to exemplify the profoundness of a felt sense of anonymity, something we will come to shortly.

The state of being anonymous was put into practice long before the word appeared in English; through the works of Plato, in religious doctrines, and the like. It wasn’t until the invention of Europe’s first printing press by Gutenberg that we see it highly associated with authorship. In the midst of a communication revolution initiated by the printing press, anonymity becomes enveloped in, and at the same time a determining factor of, a major cultural shift spanning over hundreds of years. The “typographical fixity,” coined by Elizabeth Eisenstein, provides the opportunity for “scholars, artists, and scientists [to] increasingly take their dignity not from their ability to reproduce the old, but from the ways in which they introduce new articulation of meaning within the established forms” (Leed, 1982, p. 420). The ability to fix knowledge in print form allowed for the focus to be taken off the preservation of knowledge and freed those assigned the responsibility of preservation to focus their efforts on other endeavors. This was the revolution. This is what perpetuated “such a model, one that describes the ways in which a new means of communication alters the modes in which human beings fix, appropriate, and disseminate the resources of meaning provided them by their culture” (Leed, 1982, p. 414). How individuals view their place in the world and organize their symbols to produce meaning was changing.

The opportunities to contribute to the knowledge base, and have your name go down in the historical/academic record, provided the conditions for identification to be desired. At the same time the foundation that was being laid to exponentially advance European society academically and technologically would eventually lead to a desire for identification in an entirely different context. In contrast, this time period fostered an environment where anonymity is, what Anne Ferry calls an “aesthetic ideal”.

In her 2002 article, Ferry gives a brief historical time line of the uses of anonymity. Starting in the late 16th century it was considered socially unacceptable for people of rank to publish poetry, so in order to advance in courtly circles they would publish under pseudonyms that were easily seen though (Ferry, 2002). As we move into the mid-17th century there is a need for purely anonymous authorship as women begin to publish written works more often and individuals have an increasing desire to express their opposing political views. In all three instances anonymity, or pseudo-anonymity in the first case, serves the purpose of protection, allowing authors to publish controversial material (i.e. their identities, or lack thereof, of rank and gender and the written material itself). But as the 18th and 19th centuries approach there is a use of anonymity in a much different sense.

The traditional reasons for anonymity are still present but to a much lesser extent. New appearances are attributed more to fashion, publishing tactics, or private caution. This indicates to us that social changes are shifting and authors are also shifting what they believe to be important. The latter attribute of private caution sheds light on a new aspect of anonymity that takes away from the traditional purpose of poetry as objective and moves more in the direction of poetry as personal expression and confession. This becomes more prominent in the early 20th century as the “desire to escape over-personal interpretations of their poems added new reason for anonymous publication when the old ones were fading or had virtually disappeared” (Ferry, 2002, p. 197); with poetry taking the form of personal expression, anonymity as an aesthetic ideal still reigns and maybe in an even deeper sense. Individuals are now using anonymity to (re)create their identities with the only intent being for their own personal enjoyment, since the viewers are unaware of the author. Still in the 20th century we see another use for anonymity coming to the fore. “The Cult of Anonymity”, an article published in the Nation in 1930 by a group of unidentified writers in Paris, exemplifies this movement of withholding the author(s) name in order to emphasize the importance of the idea, or as Henry Hazlitt (1930) put it, “to curb the exploitation of personalities, and to establish ‘the art as an ideal, not the ego’”.

There are other cases of anonymity being the aesthetic ideal sprinkled throughout history. In her 1886 book, Terry Castle discusses the masquerades of the 18th century which functioned to break barriers of class, gender, and ethnicity by challenging social norms; like many anonymous happenings, both written and enacted, the masquerade had strong and vocal opponents. Thought to be a gathering of immorality attended by lower class, such as "Chamber-Maids, Cook-Maids, Foot-Men, and Apprentices" (Castle, 1986, p. 96). During the same century, social conflicts in rural England represent anonymous authorship in a more sinister light. E. P. Thompson (1976) writes on the “Black Act” (a package of laws designed to squelch poachers, timber thieves, and other rural misbehaviors). Practitioners of these anonymous acts wore masks and delivered threatening letters to landlords, wardens, and gamekeepers who they felt were unfairly gaining possession over land and crops.

Many of these examples demonstrate reasons for anonymity that are still present today; they have just taken a slightly different form, if at all. But what is strikingly interesting is that at the same time all of this “aesthetic idealism” is taking place (i.e. late 18th century into the 19th and 20th centuries) another type of anonymity is developing. This sense of anonymity that is counter to the aesthetic ideal, Ferry refers to it as a cultural motif, may also be thought of as a forced anonymity. We start to see this with the rise of the Industrial Revolution and continue to see it perpetuating itself today.

The drop off in anonymous writings seen in the 20th century can be attributed to the fact that the industrial revolution brought with it a sense of what Henry Seidel Canby in his 1926 article “Anon is Dead” describes as the longing for “escape from the deadly anonymity of modern life,” which generates the, “passion for nonanonymity” in the “general man who feels his personality sinking lower and lower into the whirl of indistinguishable atoms to be lost in a mass civilization.” (Ferry, 2002, p. 199-200). What he is describing here is the anonymity that is being forced upon people as they become cogs in the machine of mass production; anonymity as a “social evil”. Ferry references Canby’s (1926) description of this new way of life as “City living” which is “essentially impersonal,” but also with “standardized” feelings, with “science” and its “laws that…ignore individuality completely,” with all that to the writer constituted “mass civilization” (Ferry, 2002, p. 200). This shift from anonymity as “without name” to a “cultural phenomenon” completely transforms any definition of the word since documented. The turn of the century not only brought a revolution in the industry of production but a revolution in how individuals perceive themselves.

Anonymity as a cultural motif means that the desire for anonymity has taken a complete downturn and that the need for individual expression is at an all time high. This brings us full circle to where we first started with identity. At this point in time though it is more about personal expression of self, as in the “what kind of person is this” sense, more than it is about straight up identification, as in the “who is this person?” sense. This is fitting because if you consider the societal circumstances that were in place hundreds of years prior to the 20th century there was not as much time, if you will, for things of this nature (i.e. development of self as unique from the whole). Not to say it wasn’t happening, because it’s difficult to do ethnography in a time period that has passed with people who are no longer living, it calls for much speculation and imagination on my part, which is more difficult than it seems because proper representation is of utmost importance. What I’m trying to say here is that individuality was not as much of a concern in the past and if it was it was definitely not nearly as attainable as it is today. Those who sought out to be markedly different from the masses were often ridiculed if not persecuted. In this way it is easier to see how identity has transformed right along side anonymity and is doing so as I type this.

It is important to note, though, that despite the cultural shifts that have taken place over time there is an telling resemblance to the conditions and resulting phenomena that have manifested in our recent past and present. The events banned in the “Black Act” are similar in purpose and portrayal as the group Anonymous is doing today both in the virtual world and in “real life”. The use of anonymity as a tool for private caution by poets writing for self expression and confession, resemble the ideas behind PostSecret. Nothing is more apparent today than anonymity as a cultural phenomenon. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution we have done nothing but increase the desire for self expression as it seems we are loosing our sense of significance more and more each day. Hence the creation of the multitude of social networking sites that allow individuals to post their life story in profile format and the continual obsession with “reality” TV shows and those that are formatted as contests to determine who is the best at this or that. Bombarded with millions of choices in every aspect of our lives individuals strive to make meaning out of anything that allows for it.

This does not mean that anonymity is dead though. What differentiates this time period today from that of the Industrial Revolution is that anonymity and the need for individual expression are almost balanced. There is more opportunity to be anonymous today because of the internet and more reason to embrace it because of all the opinions we are able to formulate outside of the norm thanks to our endless array of intellectual choices. So at the same time we are striving for individuality we are also embracing a sense of anonymity, some more than others. What the internet allows us to do is create our persona into what we want it to be. Whether this matches up to what we really are is another story. So does this constitute anonymity? If I can create myself in the image that I want to be and I am no where near that in actuality does that mean my pseudo identity is essentially anonymous? The internet has created an obvious need to delve deeper into the working of our cultural framework and how it is manifesting itself in our global society in order to rework the definitions of not only anonymity but identity itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benedict, R. (1934). The individual and the pattern of culture. In Patterns of culture (pp. 251-278). New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Caplan, J., Torpey, J. C. (2001). Documenting individual identity: the development of state practices in the modern world. Princeton University Press.

Castle, T. (1986). Masquerade and Civilization: the Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English Culture and Fiction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Cohen, A. P. (1993). Culture as identity: An anthropologist’s view. New Literary History, 24(1), 195-209. Retrieved from JSTOR database.

Ferry, A. (2002). “Anonymity”: The literary history of a word. New Literary History, 33(2), 193-214. Retrieved from JSTOR database.

Hazlitt, H. (1930). “The cult of anonymity”. Nation, 131, 350. Retrieved from Anne Ferry’s Anonymity: A Literary History of a Word.

Mill, J. S. (1921). On liberty and other essays. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Leed, E. J. (1982). Review: Elizabeth Eisenstein’s the printing press as an agent of change and the structure of communications revolutions. The American Journal of Sociology, 88(2), 413-429. Retrieved from JSTOR database.

Thompson, E. P. (1976). Whigs and hunters: The origin of the Black Act. Allen Lane.